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A FLEXIBLE MODEL FOR EFFICIENT EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN 
UK COMPANIES 
 
Andreas Kokkinis, School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK  
Konstantinos Sergakis, School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK 
Abstract: Corporate contractarian literature dismisses employee participation as inefficient on 
the grounds that, if it were efficient, it would be voluntarily adopted widely. We argue that the 
scarcity of employee participation in the UK can be attributed to shareholder short-termism and 
behavioural biases and, therefore, that the question of its efficiency remains open for companies 
that want to explore this possibility. We thus propose a flexible approach that UK companies can 
follow to implement employee participation. Our approach takes into account the broader UK 
institutional framework by creating adaptable and long-term solutions for both listed and large 
private companies. We argue that the most pragmatic way to encourage efficient employee 
participation is through the introduction of formal employee advisory panels and, in the longer 
term, the proliferation of employee share ownership schemes coupled with special rights to 
appoint a number of directors in tandem with the size of employee share ownership.  
Keywords: corporate governance, employee participation, employee share ownership schemes.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of the role of employees 1  in corporate governance, and of employee 
representation on corporate boards in particular, is a politically sensitive one that has 
recently attracted regulatory attention and triggered a heated public debate in the UK2  
                                                             
 We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and all colleagues who provided comments and insights 
in the process of writing this paper, and especially Professor Brian Cheffins, Professor Simon Deakin, 
Professor David Kershaw, Professor Iain MacNeil and Professor Marc Moore. Of course, the views 
expressed herein and any errors or omissions are the authors’ own.  
1 Unless otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed on 15 July 2019. In this paper, the term ‘employee’ 
will be used broadly to denote both employees and other workers. On the legal definition of employees, 
see Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41; and Carmichael and Leese v National Power Plc [1999] UKHL 47. 
2 The latest Labour Party Conference adopted a policy of mandating employee representation on the 
boards of large companies in the form of election of one-third of the board by employees. See A. 
Cowburn, ‘Workers to make up one third of company board members under Labour, Jeremy Corbyn 
vows’ Independent (London: 23 September 2018) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-workers-boards-labour-conference-
one-third-union-a8550946.html. Shortly before becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May had also voiced her 
support for some form of worker representation on corporate boards. See N. Pratley, ‘Theresa May’s plan 
to put workers in boardrooms is extraordinary’ The Guardian (London: 11 July 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/nils-pratley-on-finance/2016/jul/11/theresa-may-plan-workers-
boardroom-reform-extraordinary-tories  
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and the US. 3  Indeed, the revised edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
contains, for the first time, guidelines for companies to engage with their workforce and 
seek employee input on governance matters. Employee participation in corporate 
governance refers to a range of institutions, voluntary or legally mandated, that engage 
employees in corporate decision-making, such as works councils with co-decision powers 
on labour matters, advisory panels, information and consultation committees, employee 
share ownership schemes and board representation. Employee board representation can 
take the form of the election of a minority of directors, or of parity with the 
shareholders, and can be implemented either on a unitary board or at the supervisory 
board level in systems with a two-tier board structure.4  
Taking into account the broader UK institutional framework, we argue that the 
most feasible way to encourage efficient employee participation is through the 
introduction of formal employee advisory panels and, in the longer term, the 
proliferation of share ownership by employees coupled with the right to elect a number 
of board members. The proposals that we formulate present a realistic and long-term 
vision of employee participation, aiming to prepare employees adequately for taking on 
greater responsibility and for a heightened role within corporate decision-making 
structures. Our approach relies on an incremental participation model, whereby 
employees should first be given a dialogue channel through advisory panels to gain 
adequate experience before appointing board members. By advancing this proposal we 
aim to bestow a new purpose to corporate law as enabler of greater change in hybrid 
governance without disrupting shareholder based governance and undermining labour 
law mechanisms to protect employees.  
The paper is structured as follows. The first part examines the theoretical 
advantages and disadvantages of employee participation, and addresses the law and 
economics argument that we can deduce the inefficiency of employee participation from 
the absence of its widespread voluntary adoption by companies. It is argued that the 
                                                             
3 In the US, the debate revolves around reducing income inequality. US Senator Elizabeth Warren put 
forward the Accountable Capitalism Act, section 6 (b) 1 of which provides that employees of large 
corporations with total annual revenue of at least $1 billion elect at least 40% of board. The Act is available 
at:  https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act.pdf. 
4 In Germany, for instance, large companies must have a two-tier board and employees elect, depending on 
the size of the workforce, one third or half of the members of the supervisory board. For a doctrinal 
analysis and critique of the German two-tier board, see K.J. Hopt, ‘The German Two-Tier Boar 
Experience, Theories, Reforms’ in K.J. Hopt, H. Kanda, M.J. Roe, E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford: OUP, 1998); M. Roth, 
‘Corporate Boards in Germany’ in P. Davies, K. Hopt, R. Nowak and G. van Solinge, Corporate Boards in 
Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 256. 
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relative scarcity of employee participation in the UK corporate sector can be attributed 
to shareholder short-termism and behavioural biases,5 thus allowing for the possibility 
that employee participation is efficient, at least for some if not all companies. The second 
part analyses the specificities of the UK framework that would justify our flexible and 
incremental approach to match its pragmatic and efficient normative elements. It also 
aims to advance the argument that our proposals should go beyond the distinction 
between listed and large private companies since both types of companies provide a 
sufficient rationale for employee participation and board representation. Our proposals 
are therefore suitable for adoption by both listed and large private companies and can 
serve as a guide for future legal and regulatory reforms. 
The third part identifies possible strategies to implement employee participation 
and board representation, taking into account the broader UK corporate governance 
framework, history of industrial relations and level of diffusion of share ownership. It is 
argued that transposing the German system of mandatory works councils and board 
codetermination would not be appropriate, but rather that the preferable way forward 
would be a more flexible approach, implemented in two phases. The first phase would 
entail large companies setting up permanent employee advisory panels. The second phase 
would involve the adoption of rights for employee-shareholders to elect a proportion of 
directors that would reflect their total stake in the company. The fourth part addresses 
potential critiques related to the risks of ‘tokenism’ and scholarly arguments that demand 
more drastic and less flexible solutions. 
 
THE CORE LAW AND ECONOMICS ARGUMENT AGAINST EMPLOYEE 
PARTICIPATION AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
The effects of employee participation can be seen in three areas, namely: (a) employee 
motivation; (b) employee skills and expertise; and (c) efficiency of the governance of the 
firm. The first two areas concern labour productivity in a strict sense, while the third 
refers to the overall efficiency of the organisational structure of the firm.  
 
 
                                                             
5 A behavioural bias refers to the deviation of human behaviour from what is expected under assumptions 
of perfect rationality.  
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The economic advantages and disadvantages of employee participation in theory 
In terms of employee motivation and skills, labour participation can theoretically bring 
several economic advantages. 6  Being represented in decision-making increases the 
legitimacy of managerial decisions and thus can enhance employee motivation. At the 
very least, it reduces the chances that employees will be severely dissatisfied which can 
lead to industrial disputes. Especially, if the type of participatory structure includes an 
element of profit-sharing for employees, such as performance-related remuneration or 
share ownership schemes, employees face incentives to be as productive as possible to 
maximise the firm’s output. 7  Conversely, if there are no such structures and there is 
strong security of tenure, an opposite effect can also arise in terms of motivation with 
employees slacking and making suboptimal efforts.  
Assuming that participation enhances security of tenure, it is reasonable to expect 
that it will lead to a workforce with enhanced skills for two reasons. First, employees, 
expecting that they can work for the firm in the long term, are more likely to make firm-
specific investments in developing skills and acquiring knowledge that is only (or 
primarily) valuable to the particular firm.8 Second, security of tenure leads to employees 
working on average for longer periods of time for the same employer, which normally 
leads to the acquisition of higher-level skills, both firm-specific and generic. This 
correlation is due to company investment in training and professional development 
opportunities that has also been highlighted by CEO associations, denoting the 
significance of employee skills development as an indicator of corporate social 
performance. 9  
                                                             
6 For an overview, see P. Davies, ‘Efficiency Arguments for the Collective Representation of Workers: A 
Sketch’ in A. Bogg, C. Costello, A.C.L. Davies and J. Prassl (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015). 
7 For instance, in Germany collective bargaining has in the last two decades led to agreements whereby part 
of employees’ income depends on individual performance and part on company performance, including 
payment in shares. See G. Jackson, M. Hopner and A. Kurdelbusch, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions’ in H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 
2005) 106 – 112.  
8 See e.g. M.M. Blair and L.A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 24 The Journal 
of Corporation Law 751, 763 – 771. 
9 For example, the World Economic Forum’s International Business Council has integrated a set of ‘Skills 
for the Future’ metrics, such as average hours of training and expenditure per person as a key non-financial 
performance indicator: World Economic Forum, ‘Toward Common Metrics and Consistent Reporting of 
Sustainable Value Creation’ (2020) 9, available at https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/toward-
common-metrics-and-consistent-reporting-of-sustainable-value-creation.   
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that employees might be more benefitted in 
welfare terms with transferable – rather than firm-specific – skills, which are dominant in 
certain occupational labour markets as this would increase their ability to take advantage 
of external labour markets. Although we are not agnostic of the merits of transferable 
skills, we support the obtention of firm-specific skills as a means to unblock the potential 
of some employees to engage in governance and create long-term ties to corporations. In 
an ever-increasingly malleable working environment, driven by transferable skills and the 
facilitation of changing employment positions, employees might nurture a short-term 
employment mentality that is inherently detached from the engagement in governance 
activities and the overall improvement of specific firms. The serious and chronic 
problem of UK industrial relations, exemplified by the lack of trust between employers 
and employees, and the excessive reliance on the external labour market, rather than on 
the internal labour market of each firm, is a characteristic example in this sense.10 
The most complex area where employee participation has an impact is the quality 
of governance. On the positive side, the involvement of employees can lead to better-
informed decision-making and thus improve strategic management. This is because 
employees are internal stakeholders who have special knowledge about the firm. 
Moreover, as employees’ investment in the firm is not diversified, they have stronger 
incentives than dispersed shareholders to monitor management diligently and to 
constrain managerial agency costs.11  
On the negative side, law and economics scholars have asserted that employee 
participation in corporate governance reduces economic efficiency. They argue that due 
                                                             
10 As Blyton and Turnbull put it, ‘The short-term horizon of most flexibility strategies in the UK reflects a 
broader preoccupation with the short rather than the longer term, and in particular the primacy of short-
term financial performance as the measure of organisational success. […] The (over-)reliance on markets 
rather than institutions lies at the heart of poor productivity performance and many of the deleterious 
outcomes of employee relations in the UK (e.g. low wages, income inequality, the under-provision of 
training and low trust relations between management and employees).’ P. Blyton and P. Turnbull, The 
Dynamics of Employee Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd edn, 2004) 364. See also A. Pendleton and 
H. Gospel, ‘Markets and Relationships: Finance, Governance and Labour in the United Kingdom’ in H. 
Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
11 On the possibility that capital and labour can form an ‘accountability coalition’ against management, see 
G. Jackson, M. Hopner and A. Kurdelbusch, ‘Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: 
Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions’ in H. Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), Corporate 
Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 94 – 96 and 98 – 99.  
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to transaction costs12 and governance costs13 having more than one class of individuals 
with governance rights is inefficient. This is because the board of a company where 
another class of stakeholders has voting rights, alongside shareholders, would not be able 
to function efficiently due to the conflicts of interest of the two (or more) classes.14 
Decision-making would be slowed down and the flow of information from management 
to the board would be disrupted.15 Also, they argue that efficiency dictates that the class 
that has governance rights must also bear the residual risk of the firm. On this basis, one 
must reject employee participation in the corporate governance of corporations other 
than in the form of voluntary employee share ownership schemes whereby employees 
are granted ordinary shares with no special voting rights. Of course, this does not negate 
the possibility that, on some occasions, employees are the optimal class to control the 
firm and bear the residual risk, as is evidenced by the predominance of professional 
partnership firms in legal and accounting services. 16 
Elevating the debate on the well-established arguments around ‘governance’ and 
‘contract’ solutions for corporate constituency rights, it has been asserted that contractual 
protection needs to be complemented by governance mechanisms for shareholders as 
equity providers since they cannot be completely protected via contractual means. 17 
Exclusive shareholder representation in corporate governance is thus desirable since it 
offers the optimal organisational structure. This theory also implies that all other 
corporate constituency contracts are complete. Nevertheless, applying mutatis mutandis the 
concept of incomplete contracts on the employment relationship, as initially envisaged by 
                                                             
12 See O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, The Free Press, 1985) and O.E. 
Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1197. See also the seminal work of Coase: 
R.H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
13 See H. Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation 267; H. 
Hansmann, ‘When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic 
Democracy’ (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1749; and H. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
14 Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (n 13 above) 278 – 280. 
15 This is supported by evidence on the poor performance of publicly traded companies that are controlled 
by employees via share ownership. See O. Faleye, V. Mehrotra and R. Morck, ‘When Labor Has a Voice in 
Corporate Governance’ (2006) 41 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 489. 
16 For a detailed discussion of law firms as labour-owned firms, see D. Kershaw, ‘No End in Sight for the 
History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee Participation in Corporate Governance’ (2002) 2 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 34, 58 – 60. 
17 Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (n 13 above); Z. Adams and S. Deakin, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Employment Relations’ in Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Corporate Law and Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 1038. 
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Coase, 18  employment contracts are inherently incomplete. 19  Therefore, the need for 
governance mechanisms involving employees – which will form part of a hybrid 
governance model – becomes apparent but at the same time creates an intra-firm tension 
with shareholders who perceive their rights as being restricted. 
As Kershaw demonstrates, neither transaction costs nor governance costs 
analysis leads to an inevitable logical conclusion that shareholder ownership is more 
efficient than employee ownership or hybrid arrangements.20 Determining the optimal 
ownership structure depends on weighting the following factors: governance costs, 
communication and information costs, lock-in costs, employee monitoring costs and 
managerial agency costs.21 It follows that theoretical economic analysis cannot in itself 
establish that shareholder voting rights must be exclusive. Institutional arrangements 
where governance rights are shared between shareholders and employees may be more 
efficient for some firms, depending on the actual trade-offs between the various relevant 
costs involved.22 
 
Deducing the inefficiency of employee participation from its scarcity 
Determining the optimal structure for each firm and for the economy overall is therefore 
an empirical matter. However, it is a matter that cannot be conclusively answered by 
reference to available empirical evidence.23 The inconclusive nature of empirical studies 
                                                             
18 According to Coase, ‘It is this right of control or interference, of being entitled to tell the servant when 
to work (within the hours of service) and when not to work, and what work to do and how to do it (within 
the terms of such service) which is the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the servant 
from an independent contractor, or from one employed merely to give to his employer the fruits of his 
labour’: R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386, 404. 
19 See S. Deakin & F. Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A Reappraisal’ in G. De Geest, J. 
Siegers and R. van den Bergh (eds.), Law and Economics and the Labour Market (Edward Elgar, 1999). See also 
M.T. Moore and M. Petrin, Corporate Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017) 140 – 142. 
20 Ibid, 38 – 42 and 54 – 60. 
21 Ibid, 58. 
22 Ibid, 49 – 53. 
23 There are conflicting studies on the economic impact of German co-determination. Gorton and Schmid 
found a negative impact. G. Gorton and F. Schmid, ‘Capital, Labour, and the Firm: A Study of German 
Codetermination’ (2004) 2 Journal of the European Economic Association 863. Baums and Frick found that it 
had no effect. T. Baums and B. Frick, ‘Co-determination in Germany: The Impact on the Market Value of 
the Firm’ presented at Employees and Corporate Governance (New York: Columbia University Law School, 
1996). Fauver and Fuerst concluded that codetermination is conducive to higher firm market value up to a 
certain level, but that this level is probably below the one mandated by German law. L. Fauver and M.E. 
Fuerst, ‘Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German 
Corporate Boards’ (2006) 82 Journal of Financial Economics 673. FitzRoy and Kraft found that 
codetermination has led to higher labour productivity. F. FitzRoy and K. Kraft, ‘Co-determination, 
Efficiency and Productivity’ (2005) 43 British Journal of Industrial Relations 233. For a systematic review of the 
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allows for an argument that is derived from observed business practice. The economic 
analysis of corporate law, assuming that equity capital markets are informationally 
efficient, argues that employee participation in the governance of public listed companies 
must be inefficient because otherwise it would be adopted voluntarily by most, or at least 
by some, companies. It follows that employee participation must be inefficient, from the 
shareholders’ perspective.24 Any firms adopting sub-optimal governance structures would 
be at a competitive disadvantage and would therefore be less likely to survive and thrive, 
and therefore market competition ensures that the governance structures that prevail are 
optimal. Assuming that there are no externalities and other forms of market failure, the 
structure that maximises shareholder wealth will also be socially optimal. This argument 
underpins academic analyses regarding transactions costs and governance costs, as 
business practice is used as the arbiter of which way trade-offs go.25 In the same vein, 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that the shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
governance is superior to all alternative models, including the labour-oriented model 
which includes employee board representation.26  
Before engaging with this argument, it is expedient to explain the process by 
which the capital market is claimed to ensure the optimality of prevailing governance 
structures. According to the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, the price at 
which a listed share trades reflects all relevant information, public and private.27 This 
includes the company’s long-term prospects and the quality of its governance structures. 
Rational investors can thus rely on the share price and its movement to deduce 
information about the issuing company and make decisions to purchase, retain or sell 
shares in the issuing company. The outcome of this situation is that the shares of 
companies with governance structures that fail to maximise their long-term profitability 
                                                                                                                                                                              
empirical literature, see J.T. Addison, The Economics of Codetermination: Lessons from the German Experience (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and B. Frick and E. Lehmann, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: 
Codetermination, and Firm Performance in a Stakeholder Economy’ in H. Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), 
Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
24 Jensen and Meckling have expressed this argument most vividly: ‘If co-determination is beneficial to 
both stockholders and labour, why do we need laws which force firms to engage in it? Surely, they would 
do so voluntarily. The fact that stockholders must be forced by laws to accept co-determination is the best 
evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it.’ M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Rights and 
Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination’ (1979) 52 Journal of 
Business 469, 474. 
25 See Hansmann, ‘Ownership of the Firm’ (n 13 above) and Williamson (n 12 above).  
26 See H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89(2) Georgetown 
Law Journal 439, 444 – 446.  
27 On this, see the seminal work of Fama, esp. E.F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 The Journal of Finance 383.  
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will trade at a discount. This increases such companies’ cost of capital (and thus 
constrains their ability to grow) and makes them more susceptible to hostile takeovers. In 
the long term, the discipline of the capital market (cost of capital) and of the market for 
corporate control causes companies with sub-optimal governance structures to fail or to 
be taken over. It follows that listed companies that survive in countries with an active 
market for corporate control (such as the UK)28 have optimal governance structures.29 If 
such companies do not put in place systems of employee participation and board 
representation, it is because such institutions are value-decreasing in the long term, and 
therefore imposing them by law – or even setting them as the default position30 – would 
be inefficient.  
One counterargument that has been proposed against the above position is that 
employee participation is value-decreasing for shareholders but is socially optimal, as it 
brings larger benefits to employees. So, the total surplus created by companies (the 
‘corporate pie’) will grow but shareholders will receive a smaller slice than before, as the 
proportion of the surplus that goes to the employees grows more than the growth of the 
surplus. This is because, typically, employee participation both increases the joint surplus 
created by firms, due to higher productivity, and enables employees to appropriate a 
larger portion of the surplus.31 In other words, even if employee participation leads to a 
net reduction in long-term shareholder wealth, it can still be socially preferable, provided 
that the benefits it brings to employees and others exceed the cost it entails for 
shareholders.32 It follows that the level of employee participation which is optimal for 
                                                             
28 In the UK, once a bona fide takeover offer is imminent, the directors of target companies are not allowed 
to take any steps that could frustrate the takeover without the ad hoc consent of the shareholders. See City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule 21.1. The Code is underpinned by the Companies Act 2006, Part 
28.  
29 For a critical analysis of the corporate contractarian assumption that investors act as rational selectors of 
optimal corporate governance norms, see M.T. Moore, ‘The Modern Company and Quasi-Public Power’ in 
B. Choudhury and M. Petrin (eds), Understanding the Company: Corporate Governance and Theory (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2017) 88 – 91. 
30 This is because it would cause unnecessary transaction costs for companies to opt out of the default 
regime.  
31 See e.g. R. Freeman and E. Lazear, ‘An Economic Analysis of Works Councils’ in J. Rogers and W. 
Streeck, Works Councils: Consultation, Representation and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) 29.  
32  This applies the criterion of Kaldor Hicks efficiency. See J. Hicks, ‘The Foundations of Welfare 
Economics’ (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 696; and N. Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions in Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 549. See also D. Marsden and A. 
Canibano, ‘An Economic Perspective on Employee Participation’ in A. Wilkinson, P.J. Gollan, M. 
Marchington and D. Lewin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organisations (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 
141 – 142. 
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shareholders is lower than the level which is optimal for society. In fact, distributive 
matters are primarily the role of collective bargaining rather than of employee-elected 
directors. 33  However, it is true that employee participation can lead to wealth 
redistribution to employees due to increased job security and professional development. 
Still, the surplus distribution argument fails to explain why companies do not 
voluntarily introduce participation structures that would ensure that the surplus is shared 
in a way that both shareholders and employees benefit compared to the position they 
would be in if no participation structure were in place. This could be done by ensuring 
that shareholders retain overall control of the company, for instance, by allowing 
employees to elect a minority of the board and retaining the right of shareholders to 
dismiss all directors. It therefore remains necessary to explain why employee 
participation does not occur frequently on a voluntary basis to defeat the law and 
economics argument.  
 
Explaining the absence of widespread voluntary employee participation  
We submit that the explanation for the relative scarcity of endogenously created 
employee participatory institutions lies in shareholder myopia and short-termism. From 
the perceptive of listed companies, such short-termism could not conceivably be a 
problem if investors in the capital markets behaved as expected by the strong form of 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, 34  according to which share prices reflect all 
relevant information about companies.35 The semi-strong version of the efficient markets 
hypothesis, that posits that share prices reflect all publicly available information, is not 
fundamentally incompatible with the existence of short-termism, but limits its scope only 
to non-public information about the future prospects of companies. In other words, if a 
company used employee participation, its share price was depressed as a result, and it had 
strong profitability prospects due to the benefits of participation, some investors would 
                                                             
33 In Germany, for instance, codetermination did not lead to an increase in labour costs. See FitzRoy and 
Kraft (n 23 above) 373.  
34 See in general E.F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 
Journal of Finance 383; and R.J. Gilson and R.H. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 
70 Virginia Law Review 549. 
35  For early refusals of the possible existence of short-termism, see P. Marsh, Short-Termism on Trial 
(Institutional Fund Managers’ Association, 1993) and M.C. Jensen, ‘Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding 
Market Efficiency’ (1978) 6 Journal of Financial Economics 95. 
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act as arbitrageurs and bet on the increase of its share price, thus eventually correcting 
the market price, as other investors would imitate the arbitrageurs.  
There is, however, considerable evidence that investors in equity markets can be 
myopic and that shareholder short-termism can prevent the market price of shares from 
reflecting the long-term value of companies.36 In general, discounting the value of future 
benefits is rational up to an extent, in view of the limited lifespan of individuals. 
However, behavioural economic research has established that most individuals are 
irrationally short-termist, as they apply a hyperbolic discount rate to future gains. 37  Thus 
investor biases are likely to be systematic and not self-correcting. If investors place an 
irrationally discounted value to future gains and thus concentrate unduly on short-term 
gains, market discipline will penalise companies that adopt strategies or governance 
structures that are optimal in the long term but profit-decreasing in the short term.38 As a 
result, prevailing corporate governance structures will be biased in favour of short-term 
gains and need not be optimal. In particular, Moore and Walker-Arnott identify two 
forms of investor short-termism: speculative trading (including high frequency trading) 
and earnings-based investment.39 
Admittedly, there is still no academic consensus on the degree of severity of the 
problem of short-termism in capital markets. Roe, writing from a US perspective, 
recently argued that, although there has been a dramatic rise in share trading, as 
anticipated by those believing that short-termism drives capital markets, the predicted 
negative impact of short-termism on corporate R&D40 investment has not materialised.41 
                                                             
36 This has led formerly unwavering supporters of efficient markets to adopt more nuanced views. See e.g. 
M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity’ (2005) 34 Financial Management 5; and R.J. Gilson and 
R.H. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias’ in J. 
Armour and J.A. McCahery (eds), After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in 
Europe and the US (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart, 2006). For an overview of available evidence on the 
informational efficiency of capital markets, see A. Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral 
Finance (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
37  See e.g. D. Laibson, ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’ (1997) 112 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 443. For a concise discussion of prospect theory in behavioural economics research, see A. 
Kokkinis, ‘Exploring the Effects of the ‘Bonus Cap’ Rule: the Impact of Remuneration Structure on Risk-
Taking by Bank Managers’ (2019) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 167, 179 – 182. 
38 Even shareholders who are aware of the fact the share prices are overvalued due to short-term gains, 
may still retain their shares and ride the bubble with a view to selling their shares before the bubble bursts. 
See K. Greenfield, ‘The Puzzle of Short-Termism’ (2011) 46 Wake Forest Law Review 627, 636. 
39 See M.T. Moore, and E. Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-termism’ (2014) 41 Journal 
of Law and Society 416, 424 – 427. 
40 This stands for ‘research and development’. 
41  M.J. Roe, ‘Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact’ (2018) ECGI Working Paper N° 426/2018 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3171090. 
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This is substantiated by evidence on extensive R&D investment by US tech-oriented 
companies, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft.42 However, most 
of these companies are controlled by their founders, often through devices such as dual-
class shares,43 and thus are not typical ‘Berle and Means corporations’44 where share 
ownership is dispersed and separated from control which lies with the board. It is 
evident that the R&D investment preferences of controlling shareholders are likely to be 
long-term-oriented and having control, these individuals are likely to resist short-termist 
pressures from the market. At any rate, our analysis is focused on the UK where there is 
extensive evidence of decreasing R&D investment45 and of costly equity market short-
termism.46 
Arguably, employee participation is a typical example of a governance structure 
that incurs considerable upfront costs (setting up the structure and adapting to the new 
way of making decisions), while its benefits only materialise in the long term. It takes 
time for employees to develop firm-specific skills, to change their mentality in favour of 
stronger motivation and to become effective corporate governance actors. Furthermore, 
as short-termist shareholders tend to focus on the fluctuation of the share price rather 
than on analysing the fundamental features of companies, they are unlikely to engage 
with the governance needs of each individual company.47 Employee participation is likely 
to be beneficial for many but not for all companies, and therefore assessing whether its 
introduction would be desirable for a given company requires close engagement. Instead, 
                                                             
42 See ibid, 28 – 30.  
43 Bezos has voting control of approximately 16% of Amazon’s shares, while Google, Facebook, LinkedIn 
Groupon, Snap, Trip Advisor and Zynga are controlled by their founders through dual-class share 
structures, i.e. shares carrying multiple votes. For a critique of perpetual dual-class shares, see L.A. 
Bebchuk and K. Kastiel, ‘The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock’ (2017) 103 Virginia Law 
Review 585.  
44 This term refers to Berle and Means’ groundbreaking 1932 empirical study. See A. Berle and G Means, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev edn, New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). 
45 See J. Kay, ‘The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Final Report’ 
(2012) [1.8] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/kay-reviewpublishes-report-on-uk-financial-sector. 
46 For instance, Davies et al conclude that there is ‘a quantitatively significant degree of short-termism in 
capital markets, whether measured by the cost of capital or investment intentions’. See R. Davies, A.G. 
Haldane, M. Nielsen and S. Pezzini, ‘Measuring the Costs of Short-Termism’ (2014) 12 Journal of Financial 
Stability 16, 25.  
47 Empirical studies conducted in the past are not conclusive as to whether shareholder activism is crucial 
to improving companies’ performance or simply irrelevant. Regardless of the negative or positive effect of 
this kind of activism, it could be said that in theory it is preferable to have a certain amount of indirect 
pressure from asset managers or asset owners of the shares, which will possibly alert the company’s 
management and avert certain deficiencies in conducting business: S.L. Gillan and L.T. Starks, ‘The 
Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’ (2007) 19 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 55; R. 
Romano, ‘Less is More: Making Institutional Shareholder Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate 
Governance’ (2001) 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 174.  
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UK investors tend to promote uniform standards of good governance across the sector, 
without due regard to the individual governance needs of each company.48 One of the 
major viaducts of lack of investor engagement and short-termism is the long chain of 
intermediation and, especially, the fixation of pension fund and investment fund trustees 
with prevailing investment practices, 49  including passive investment, high-frequency 
trading and earnings-based investment. 
A further reason that explains investor negativity to employee participation is the 
status quo bias. This is a well-documented phenomenon whereby consumers are unlikely 
to deviate from default options to the effect that their ultimate choice is heavily 
influenced by the way the default option is set.50 In our context, the default option is 
exclusive shareholder voting rights with no employee participation.51 Bias in this context 
can be particularly strong due to the combination of the status quo bias with the 
endowment effect, that is, the irrational overvaluing of things to which individuals feel 
entitled.52 As the default option is one where a form of “ownership right” is assigned to 
investors they will have the tendency to overvalue it and thus be reluctant to “sell” parts 
of it, even if doing so would be economically beneficial.  
A counterargument could be drawn from the fact that employee participation is 
also rarely observed in large private companies that are not exposed to capital market 
short-termism. But such companies are also not exposed to capital market discipline so 
there is no reason to assume that their governance structure is optimal in the first place. 
In any case, short-termism also affects companies supported by private equity, in view of 
the not so long investment horizons and the fact that it is common for these companies 
to be eventually (re-)admitted to trading on the stock exchange, which means that the 
                                                             
48 On this, see M.T. Moore, ‘Whispering Sweet Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in 
UK Corporate Governance’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 95. On the broader issue of lack of 
shareholder engagement with investee companies, see B.R. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ 
Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 985. 
49 This is partly due to their fiduciary duty to exercise prudence and partly to their business models. On 
this, see R.M. Barker and I. H.-Y. Chiu, Corporate Governance and Investment Management: The Promises and 
Limitations of the New Financial Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) 93 – 102.  
50 On this, see R. Korobkin, ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules’ (1997) 83 Cornell Law Review 
608, esp. 625–47. 
51  Nothing in English company law prevents the articles of association of companies from assigning 
director appointment rights to employees. But section 168 of the Companies Act 2006, which is mandatory 
law, provides that any director can be removed by ordinary resolution of the members at any time.  
52 For experimental evidence on this, see D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler, ‘Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’ (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 1325; and L. 
Babcock and G. Loewenstein, ‘Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases’ (1997) 11 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 109. 
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expectations of the capital market remain relevant.53 As far as family firms are concerned, 
another significant category of large private companies, the status quo bias and 
endowment effect can explain the rare adoption of employee participation.  
In addition to the aforementioned investor mentality, we argue that the lack of a 
sound investment culture and of investment educational efforts54 contributes inevitably 
to the furtherance of cognitive limitations, by further constraining market actors’ capacity 
to conceive of employee participation as an opportunity to contribute to a company’s 
long-term economic growth, including their own interests, and no longer as a costly 
scenario. Indeed, we believe that employee participation has not been accepted as 
legitimate practice by most UK companies due to the wider communication gaps 
between corporate constituencies and the lack of education in capital markets. Isolating 
economic interests and dissociating them from the workforce results in perceiving 
employee participation as limited to collective bargaining and ultimately irrelevant in the 
shaping of a corporate governance system. Moreover, investment trends have shown a 
shift towards sustainable finance, and they perceive income inequality and the lack of 
balance between management and workforce as a risk.55 This new trend, coupled with 
strong public policy support both in the UK56 and in the EU,57 may thus trigger a real 
change in the way investors perceive employee participation and seek to convince 
investee companies to adjust to these new challenges. 
While education58 in capital markets may be viewed as an idealistic or utopic goal, 
we must remember that such markets are still composed of individuals who seek profit 
regardless of their position, responsibilities or power, as well as the possibility or 
willingness for interaction with other participants. If the market has become fragmented 
and interaction between actors remains – in many cases – dysfunctional, lawmakers must 
                                                             
53  For a discussion of private equity transactions, see L. Gullifer and J. Payne, Corporate Finance Law: 
Principles and Policy (2nd edn, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015) ch 16. 
54 On this, see K. Sergakis, The Law of Capital Markets in the EU (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 13 – 
14. 
55 See The Investment Integration Project, ‘Why and How Investors Can Respond to Income Inequality’ 
(2018) https://www.unpri.org/academic-research/why-and-how-investors-can-respond-to-income-
inequality-/3777.article. See also Workforce Disclosure Initiative, ‘Improving the Quality of Jobs: Pilot 
Year Report’ (2018) https://shareaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/WDI-Pilot-Year-Report.pdf.  
56  Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Climate Change and Green Finance’ (2018) Discussion Paper 18/8 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp18-08.pdf.  
57 D. Busch, G. Ferrarini and A. van den Hurk, ‘The European Commission’s Sustainable Finance Action 
Plan’ (2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3263690. 
58  On investor education, see N. Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010) 374. 
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find ways to change the dynamics of this system and to place some common principles at 
the heart of the investment community. These principles should be the common 
perception of the primary purpose of capital markets, corporations and investment. 
Although the content of these principles continues to be hotly debated and a common 
solution to the satisfaction of all parties cannot easily be reached, the purpose of 
educational efforts will be to reorient their short-term goals for profit and show them 
that if they work collectively they may have a chance of achieving the same profit under a 
long-term perspective without compromising their position, while preserving the stability 
of the system since speculation would not be their unique goal in the market.59 On the 
contrary, a reinterpretation of shareholder role within companies as the rational 
negotiators of a new bargain with employees would be necessary to accept the transition 
to a new state of affairs wherein employees will become a vital component for growing 
the corporate pie.  
To sum up, the absence of employee participation from the majority of listed 
public companies in countries where it is not mandated by the law does not in itself 
establish that employee participation is inefficient. Short-termism and behavioural biases 
among investors prevent them from perceiving employee participation as a driver for 
growth of the ‘corporate pie’ which they would still be able to negotiate how to divide, 
without foregoing their prerogatives. This explains the reluctance of corporate managers 
to experiment with employee participation. At the same time, economic analysis suggests 
that there are normally strong benefits in combining control rights with a residual interest 
in the company, which points towards the merits of employee share ownership schemes. 
It is up to companies and their equity investors to assess whether employee participation 
would be beneficial for them and what would be the best means to implement it.  
 
Qualitative arguments supporting the value of employee participation in the 
governance of modern UK companies 
A system, such as the current UK one, that strongly protects shareholder interests via an 
active market for corporate control60 and performance-based executive remuneration is 
                                                             
59  On these new priorities, see K. Sergakis, ‘Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the “Comply or 
Explain” Principle in EU Capital Markets’ (2015) 5(3) Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium 233, 282. 
60 As Kershaw observes: ‘Therefore, perhaps slightly counter intuitively, an effective market for corporate 
control unhindered by anti-takeover defences and anti-takeover statutes may be more conducive to 
employee strategic representation.’ Kershaw (n 16 above) 53.  
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more likely to be improved by the introduction of employee participation than a system 
of weak shareholders. This is because the financial incentives created by the market for 
corporate control and executive remuneration closely align the behaviour of managers 
with the interests of shareholders. Such structures are likely to be sufficient to entice 
investors to invest even without exclusive voting rights. Conversely, the absence of 
labour participation in the present system leads to a high risk of opportunistic behaviour 
against employees, which will lead to reduced firm-specific investment and productivity.61 
In other words, while shareholders were weak, takeovers were rare and executive 
remuneration was not tied to performance, the absence of labour participation was 
necessary to persuade investors to invest without demanding a prohibitively high 
premium. It was also unlikely to lead to negative outcomes in terms of productivity, due 
to the broad discretion enjoyed in practice by corporate boards to balance the interests 
of capital and labour. 62  At present, however, the increased safeguards provided to 
shareholders make labour participation both more feasible and more beneficial.  
In parallel, given that collective labour law functions as a substitute for labour 
participation in corporate governance, the benefits of introducing labour participation 
are reduced. This was arguably the case in the UK until the 1980s when strong trade 
unions and extensive coverage of collective bargaining agreements provided some 
safeguards for employees to make firm-specific investments in the absence of board 
representation. However, in recent years trade union membership and collective 
bargaining coverage in the UK have reduced dramatically, and they currently stand at 
26% and 29% respectively. 63   It follows that the potential economic significance of 
labour participation in corporate governance for the UK economy has increased and is 
continuing to increase in tandem with the weakening of unionised labour. 
An additional argument concerns the nature of work that most workers provide 
now compared to a few decades ago. If the output of work is easy to measure, it is easy 
                                                             
61 Indeed, Deakin and others conclude that the UK corporate governance framework constrains managers’ 
ability to make credible long-term commitments to employees, which undermines the development of 
effective labour-management partnerships unless a critical mass of institutional investors take a long-term 
perspective. See S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, S. Konzelmann, and F. Wilkinson, ‘Partnership, Ownership and 
Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Employment Relations’ (2002) 24 Employee Relations 
335. 
62 In the UK and the US, this period lasted from the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, when the 
current outsider system emerged. On this, see A. Dignam and M. Galanis, The Globalisation of Corporate 
Governance (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009) 221 – 227.   
63  These data was taken from a specialist website created by ETUI: http://www.worker-
participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/United-Kingdom. 
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for management to ensure that workers are optimally productive by setting up 
appropriate individualised incentives. If, however, the nature of work is such that its 
outcome is hard to value and to apportion to individual workers, monitoring by 
management becomes very difficult. In such circumstances, employee participation can 
act as a powerful incentive to maximise productivity, which can be more cost-effective 
than monitoring and individual assessment. Arguably, work in recent years has become 
more creative and intellectual capital is the main competitive advantage for successful 
companies.64 This suggests that in the modern economy, which is dominated by the 
services sector and where the majority of work is creative and collaborative, the benefits 
of labour participation have increased compared to the post-war manufacturing-based 
economy. 65  In many specialised services, the quality of work is difficult to observe 
externally by anyone who does not have the same level of skill as the worker, at least 
without spending a disproportionate amount of time scrutinising the output.  
Finally, it must be noted that a significant potential benefit of employee 
participation, namely, increased labour productivity, is particularly important for the UK 
economy, which suffers from a long-term lag in productivity compared to other major 
economies.66 Indeed, in 2016, UK hourly labour productivity was significantly lower than 
in Italy, Germany, France and the US. It was at a par with Canada and in excess of 
Japan’s productivity.67  
However, some proponents of shareholder-based governance have argued that, 
even if this type of governance may not always be superior to alternatives, it is definitely 
necessary for radical innovation.68 It would thus appear that hybrid governance hampers 
such innovation because employee governance rights may block decisions, such as 
                                                             
64  S.M. Jacoby, ‘Corporate Governance and Employees in the United States’ in H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 
2005) 45 – 46.  
65 This argument is consistent with the rationale of arguments in favour of a stakeholder approach in the 
era of the knowledge economy. See e.g. T. Clarke, ‘The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy 
for the Information Age’ (1998) 31 Long Range Planning 182. 
66 According to some accounts, the cost to the UK economy of the lack of ‘clear corporate purposes that 
unite all stakeholders in common goals and values’ amounts to £130 billion per year. See Big Innovation 
Centre, ‘The Purposeful Company: Interim Report’ (2016) 4 http://biginnovationcentre.com/purposeful-
company  
67 Office for National Statistics, International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), final estimates: 2016 (2018) 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/bulletins/inter
nationalcomparisonsofproductivityfinalestimates/2016. 
68  F. Belloc, ‘Law, Finance and Innovation: The Dark Side of Shareholder Protection’ (2013) 37(4) 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 863; A. Shleifer and L. Summers, ‘Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers’ in A. 
Auerbach (ed.) Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1988).  
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massive redundancies that are occasionally necessary for firms to be able to adjust to 
fast-paced market changes. Hybrid governance may also render shareholders subject to 
potential opportunism by employees. 69  Nevertheless, the persistence of founder-
entrepreneur majority voting control in many high-tech innovative companies 70 
undermines the argument that capital markets, associated with external investor 
discipline, promote radical innovation. If the founders of such companies opt for 
insulating their business strategy from short-term market pressures that may result in 
high turnover in their workforce, they contribute indirectly towards security of 
employment and the development of firm-specific skills. The ensuing benefits on 
employees engaging with companies in the long-term under such conditions denotes the 
possibility of a harmonious symbiosis between radical innovation and hybrid governance.  
It is therefore unsurprising that in recent years there has been an increasing 
interest on behalf of firms and regulators in employee participation. For instance, Andy 
Haldane, the Bank of England executive director for financial stability, has argued that 
putting workers on boards would be economically beneficial, and that employee-owned 
firms perform better than corporations. 71 Furthermore, a recent policy report issued by 
ICAEW argues that employee directors would add value to UK companies by providing 
valuable information to the board, supporting long-term thinking, boosting employee 
morale, enhancing wider stakeholder engagement, and improving board behaviour. 72 
Indeed, it must be noted that employees would be likely to use corporate governance 
voice also to exert pressure on companies towards adopting ethical corporate behaviour, 
as indicated by recent employee-driven campaigns involving large US technology 
companies such as Google.73 The purpose of the rest of this article is to canvass a 
workable model that UK companies can adopt in order to implement meaningful 
employee participation.  
 
                                                             
69  H. Shadab, ‘Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes–Oxley’ (2007) 10(4) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business and Employment Law 955.  
70 See footnotes 42 and 43 and accompanying text.  
71  P. Aldrick, ‘Bank of England’s Haldane Supports Workers on Boards’ The Times (London: 28 
September 2018) https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bank-of-england-s-haldane-supports-workers-on-
boards-xc3jxqr9v. 
72 ICAEW, ‘How Employee Directors Add Value’ (2018) https://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate-governance/connect-and-reflect/how-employee-directors-
add-value.ashx  
73 See S. Shane and D. Wakabayash, ‘‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest Work for the 
Pentagon’ The New York Times (New York, NY, 4 April 2018).  
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THE ROLE OF LABOUR IN UK CORPORATE GOVERANCE: 
EVOLUTION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
To design a pragmatic model for employee participation in UK companies it is pertinent 
to understand the relevant broader features of UK corporate governance and the history 
of ideas around employee participation in the UK. It is generally recognised that 
developed market economies can be categorised as either liberal market economies 
(notably the US, the UK and Canada) or coordinated market economies (notably 
Germany, Japan and the Nordic countries).74 In terms of corporate governance, liberal 
market economies are characterised by diffuse share ownership, deep capital markets, an 
active market for corporate control and shareholder value maximisation, underpinned by 
strong legal protection of investors.75 Coordinated market economies are characterised 
by concentrated ownership, heavy reliance of corporations on bank lending, a relatively 
inactive market for corporate control and balancing the interests of all stakeholders.76  
The starkest difference between the two models is perhaps in the role of labour, 
which in Anglo-American corporate governance is viewed as external to the firm, 
whereas in central European corporate governance is viewed as internal. Since the 2008 
global financial crisis, interest in the continental European model of corporate 
governance has increased both in the UK and internationally, while at the same time the 
Anglo-American model has been under heavy criticism on account of its undue emphasis 
on short-term profitability at the expense of economic and social sustainability.77 Dignam 
and Galanis, for instance, conclude their comparative study of the Anglo-American 
(external) and central European (internal) models by speculating that the latter may now 
                                                             
74  For a comparative analysis of German and UK capitalism, see S. Vitols, ‘Varieties of Capitalism: 
Comparing Germany and the UK’ in P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
75 The question remains whether protective corporate and securities laws are a determinant of diffuse share 
ownership or a consequence of it. The former view is supported by R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. 
Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. Roe has 
also argued that employee participation is harmful for shareholders and therefore that in countries with 
mandatory employee participation separation of ownership from control cannot occur, as concentrated 
ownership counterbalances the strength of labour. See M.J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: 
Political Context, Corporate Impact (Oxford: OUP, 2003). The latter view is taken by B.R. Cheffins, Corporate 
Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 33 – 40.  
76 See Dignam and Galanis (n 62 above) ch 2. 
77 For an overview of recent critical UK corporate law and governance literature, and a radical critique of 
the current system, see L.E. Talbot, ‘Trying to Save the World with Company Law? Some Problems’ 
(2016) 36 Legal Studies 513. See also C. Meyer, Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation Is Failing Us and How to 
Restore Trust in It (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 
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have a chance of resisting convergence pressures by globalised markets due to the 
reduced credibility of the Anglo-American model as a result of the crisis.78  
 
Historical evolution of ideas surrounding employee participation in the UK  
UK firms have traditionally been highly reluctant to consider employee representation at 
board level.79 Rather, labour has long been seen as external to the corporation and the 
relationship between employees, on the one hand, and shareholders and management, on 
the other, has historically been highly adversarial and organised around collective 
bargaining and industrial action.80   
In the UK, until the 1970s the labour movement and Labour Party did not focus 
on the possibility of labour participation in corporate governance, as their preferred 
course was nationalisation of large companies, which would have made participation 
redundant.81 This changed in 1975 when the Labour government appointed a committee 
to examine employee representation on boards. The committee was chaired by Lord 
Bullock and produced its final report in 1976.82 Consistent with the prevailing political 
context of the 1970s, the Bullock Report was framed in terms of industrial democracy 
and democracy at the workplace rather than economic efficiency and business 
expediency, although considerations of efficiency were also prominent in the 
committee’s deliberations.83 The committee did not manage to reach consensus. The 
members who represented employers’ associations disagreed with other members and 
refused to sign off on the report. They were in favour of encouraging companies to 
engage with employees and, where appropriate, put in place board representation for 
employees, but firmly against any mandatory legal rules forcing companies to have 
                                                             
78 Dignam and Galanis (n 62 above) 413 – 419. 
79 For a brief discussion of early exceptions to this trend, see n 85 below. 
80 The dominance of the adversarial model of industrial relations is evident in Moore’s analysis. See M.T. 
Moore, ‘Reconstituting Labour Market Freedom: Corporate Governance and Collective Worker 
Counterbalance’ (2014) 43 Industrial Law Journal 398. 
81  For a detailed account of the views of Labour thinkers, politicians and trade unions on industrial 
democracy until the 1970s, see B. Clift, A. Gamble and M. Harris, ‘The Labour Party and the Company’ in 
J. Parkinson, A Gamble and G. Kelly (eds), The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford and Portland, OR: 
Hart Publishing, 2000) 54 – 76.  
82  Department of Trade, Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Cmnd 6706, 1977). 
Thereafter abbreviated as the ‘Bullock Report’.  
83 Bullock Report 22 – 23 but also 45 – 46. For a contemporary discussion of the concept of democracy in 
the workplace, see R. Archer, ‘Freedom, Democracy, and Capitalism: Ethics and Employee Participation’ 
in A. Wilkinson, P.J. Gollan, M. Marchington and D. Lewin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Participation in 
Organisations (Oxford: OUP, 2010).  
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employee representation on their boards. 84  A different approach was taken by the 
Industrial Participation Association, which was in favour of legally mandating companies 
to negotiate with their workforce for a given period of time in order to reach an 
agreement on employee representation. Failing agreement, they proposed that the law 
should, by default, impose the election of one-third of the board by the employees.85  
Conversely, trade union representatives were supportive of employee board 
representation, cautioning, however, that such a system must not undermine collective 
bargaining and that representation must be achieved through the unions.86 Eventually, 
the committee’s report recommended a system quite similar to German full-parity 
codetermination, but insisted on the merit of unitary boards. Under the committee’s 
recommendations, boards would consist of equal numbers of shareholder and employee 
representatives, plus a component of neutral directors who would be co-opted by the 
two groups.87 The neutral directors would not exceed one-third of the board and their 
number would be odd so that the total number of board members would be odd. The 
size of the board would depend on the size of each company’s workforce, as shown in 
Table 2 below. The negative stance of several trade unions and the equanimity of the 
Labour government of the time meant that these proposals were never implemented.88  
An initial assessment of this historical account of employee representation in the 
UK shows the considerable disparity of opinions, not simply between politicians and 
stakeholders, but also amongst stakeholders themselves. The resistance to achieving a 
commonly shared solution inevitably has cultural roots, by determining each party’s 
idiosyncrasies and beliefs in relation to employee participation. Our proposals reflect 
these features by arguing that such discrepancies have become economically costly and 
inefficient. In order to maximise the economic benefits of employee participation for 
companies, we propose two steps that will allow for a gradual elevation of mentalities 
across the board: the introduction of formal advisory panels, and the subsequent 
appointment of employees to the board via employee share ownership schemes. At the 
same time, the public policy emphasis on shareholder value maximisation since the 1980s 
                                                             
84 Bullock Report 30 – 33.  
85 Bullock Report 32.  
86 According to the TUC, ‘Another source of concern was that board representation might conflict with 
the traditional role of trade unions, which is seen as one opposing management in collective bargaining, 
not collaborating with it on the board.’ Bullock Report 39.  
87 Bullock Report 98 – 101.  
88 For a detailed discussion of the politics surrounding the abandonment of the Bullock Report, see Clift, 
Gamble and Harris (n 81 above) 78 – 80.  
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can be explained by the emergence of UK occupational pension funds and other 
domestic institutional investors as major shareholders, a trend now partially reversed. 89   









2,000 - 9,999 
employees 
4 4 3 11 
10,000 - 24,999 
employees 
5 5 5 15 
25,000 or more 
employees 
7 7 7 21 
As a result, in the UK, there has never been any compulsory legal requirement 
for companies to have employee representation on the board. Of course, there have 
historically been several cases of voluntary adoption of employee board representation, 
particularly by nationalised corporations.90 
 
Legal framework facilitating employee share ownership 
Instead, since the 1980s, UK policy has focused on employee share ownership,91 as an 
alternative to direct participation in corporate governance. 92 The law grants considerable 
tax advantages to employees who own shares via an eligible scheme. This evidently 
                                                             
89 For an in-depth exploration of the politics surrounding the trend of increased share ownership by 
occupational pension funds in the 1970s and 1980s, see A. Davies, ‘Pension Funds and the Politics of 
Ownership in Britain, c. 1970–86’ (2019) 30 Twentieth Century British History 81. 
90 An example of this was the British Steel Corporation where three ordinary employees were chosen 
randomly to sit on the boards of some of the four main subsidiaries of the group. A qualitative study on 
worker participation in the British Steel Corporation from 1969 to 1971 found that worker directors did 
not feel that they had been influential and that the main impact of their involvement was that many of 
them stopped complying with their line managers’ instructions. See P. Brannen and others, The Worker 
Directors (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1976) 141 – 184. More recently, FirstGroup plc has had one worker 
director since 1989. 
91  For a general discussion, see E. Kaarsemaker, A. Pendleton and E. Poutsma, ‘Employee Share 
Ownership’ in A. Wilkinson, P.J. Gollan, M. Marchington and D. Lewin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Participation in Organisations (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
92 For a discussion of employee share ownership plans in the US, see S.M. Jacoby, ‘Corporate Governance 
and Employees in the United States’ in H. Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour 
Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 45, 53 – 54.  
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incentivises employees to opt into such schemes and companies to use them. Although a 
detailed doctrinal examination of the relevant legal rules falls beyond the scope of this 
paper,93 it is pertinent to provide an overview of available schemes. Share Incentive Plans 
(SIPs) constitute the main available channel to grant shares to employees. If such shares 
are kept for five years, there is no liability for income tax and national insurance 
contributions on their value. Shares under SIPs may be granted in four ways. Employers 
may grant free shares up to £3,600 in any tax year. Employees can purchase shares out of 
their salary (called partnership shares) up to the lower of either £1,800 or 10% of their 
income during the given tax year. If employees purchase partnership shares, employers 
can match them with up to two free matching shares for each partnership share. In 
addition, employees can buy more shares using the dividends they receive from free, 
partnership or matching shares, provided that the rules of the employer’s scheme allow 
that.94 Furthermore, employees can take advantage of the Save As You Earn (SAYE) 
scheme to save up to £500 a month for either three or five years, and at the end use the 
savings and interest to buy shares at a previously agreed price, without having to pay tax 
for the difference between what they pay for their shares and their value at the time of 
purchase.95  
It is also worth noting that special company law rules in the areas of capital 
raising and maintenance facilitate employee share ownership schemes. The Companies 
Act 2006 defines an employees’ share scheme as ‘a scheme for encouraging or facilitating 
the holding of shares in or debentures of a company by or for the benefit’ of any 
employees or former employees of the company and its subsidiaries and their close 
family members.96 The term employees also covers directors.97 Shares allotted under such 
schemes are exempted from the normal requirement for shareholder authorisation to 
allot new shares,98 from shareholders’ pre-emption rights,99 and from the requirement 
that 25% of the value of the shares allotted by a public company must be paid-up.100 The 
                                                             
93 Such beneficial treatment was introduced by the Finance Act 1972 and strengthened by subsequent 
Finance Acts in 1973, 1978, 1980 and 1984. For an in-depth evaluation of such schemes and the effects of 
favourable tax treatment, see R. Richardson and A. Nejad, ‘Employee Share Ownership Schemes in the 
UK – an Evaluation’ (1986) 24 British Journal of Industrial Relations 233. 
94 Information is taken from https://www.gov.uk/tax-employee-share-schemes. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Companies Act 2006, s 1166.  
97 Companies Act 2006, s 676. 
98 Companies Act 2006, s 549 (2). 
99 Companies Act 2006, s 566. 
100 Companies Act 2006, s 586 (2).  
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provision of financial assistance for the purchase of shares under an employees’ share 
scheme is also permitted.101 
 
The Corporate Governance Code 2018 regime on engaging with the workforce  
In terms of a direct employee voice in corporate governance, the matter returned to the 
government’s agenda in 2016 when Theresa May became Prime Minister. Despite the 
Prime Minister’s prior statements on the matter, the UK government refrained from 
supporting any hard law rules requiring listed companies to put in place a system of 
participation, but rather, it highlighted the importance of encouraging firms to ‘gather the 
views of the workforce’ in flexible ways. Indeed, following a government policy paper,102 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) made changes to the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, with effect from 1 January 2019.  
The new edition of the Code requires companies to engage with their workforce 
by using one – or a combination – of the following methods.103 First, having a director 
appointed from the workforce of the company. Second, establishing a formal workforce 
advisory panel. Third, designating one of the non-executive directors as responsible for 
liaising with workers and gathering their views. Evidently, the latter option is less 
onerous than the other two and, in any case, the new provision is only applicable on a 
comply-or-explain basis.104 In particular, any companies refusing to adopt one of the 
three recommended methods of engagement will have to explain what alternative 
methods they have in place, and why they believe them to be effective. Therefore, listed 
companies remain free to design the process by which they engage with employees as 
they think fit, provided that investors are satisfied with the explanation offered.  
                                                             
101 Companies Act 2006, s 682 (2) (b).  
102 See Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The 
Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation’ (2017) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640
631/corporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf. 
103 UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, Provision 5.  See also Financial Reporting Council, ‘Proposed 
Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code’ (2017) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/f7366d6f-aa57-4134-a409-1362d220445b/;.aspx. 
104 On this principle, see A. Keay, ‘Comply or Explain: In Need of Greater Regulatory Oversight?’ (2014) 
34(2) Legal Studies 279; K. Sergakis, ‘EU Corporate Governance: A New Supervisory Mechanism for the 
‘Comply or Explain’ Principle?’ (2013) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 394; P. Sanderson, D. 
Seidl and J. Roberts, ‘Applying the ‘Comply-or-Explain’ Principle: Discursive Legitimacy Tactics with 
regard to Codes of Corporate Governance’ (2012) Journal of Management and Governance 1. 
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It follows that the effectiveness of the new provision of the Code will depend on 
whether there is sufficient market pressure on companies to comply with it, expressed 
both via ex ante (engagement and other activism strategies) and ex post (reputational 
sanctions and other social enforcement) measures. Empirical evidence on the efficiency 
of market pressure in the area of issuer disclosure of compliance with corporate 
governance code provisions can be particularly useful in this context. Indeed, taking as a 
case study the use of the ‘comply or explain’ principle by issuers, investors who receive 
the related information tend to remain apathetic even if the company does not provide 
sufficient explanation for non-compliance with a code, especially in cases where its 
operations are profitable. 105  This apathy towards ‘non-compliance’ – which only 
transforms itself into interest when corporate strategies create losses – is an alarming 
message for the usefulness and overall impact of social enforcement, based on the 
example of the perception of the ‘comply or explain’ principle.  
Applying mutatis mutandis the empirical evidence to the employee representation 
issues and the three options given above, we could argue that, if potentially harmed 
investors are solely concerned about avoiding the losses arising from not following any 
of the employee engagement options, and if the concerned issuers are sanctioned at the 
social level only when their actions harm investors, then social enforcement loses its 
importance in this context. Indeed, actors will be unlikely to react unless their own 
financial interests are harmed, notwithstanding the presence of an event that should in 
theory trigger a negative reaction. The reprioritisation of investor strategies therefore lies 
in understanding the need to react to all infringements, even when investors themselves 
are not directly harmed, and to avoid adopting a single-minded view of such violations.  
As far as investors are concerned, establishing a dialogue with the workforce is 
not a matter that is directly in their interests, contrary to other measures such as having 
independent board committees or separating the roles of chairman of the board and 
CEO.106 There are reasons to doubt the emphasis that institutional investors will place on 
demanding compliance in this area.107 Conversely, it is conceivable that the growing trend 
                                                             
105 S. Arcot, V. Bruno and A.F. Grimaud, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain 
Approach Working?’ (2010) 30 International Review of Law and Economics 99. See also I. MacNeil and X. Li, 
‘Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code’ (2006) 14 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 486. 
106 For a brief case study on the insistence of institutional investors on the separation of the roles of CEO 
and board chairman, see Moore (n 48 above) 102 – 104.  
107 For a similar argument relating to institutional investor stewardship duties, see B.R. Cheffins, ‘The 
Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 985.  
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towards socially responsible investment and the integration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria in investment strategies may lead to increased interest in 
encouraging companies to take more inclusive approaches to corporate governance and 
to focus on social sustainability, which includes dialogue with employees. 108  More 
recently, the Investment Integration Project published a report highlighting the risks 
deriving, inter alia, from deficiencies in employee relations that can further exacerbate 
income inequality and also lead to investor losses. 109 Employee disenchantment may very 
well become a real economic risk that will alarm investors and will incentivise them to 
exert pressure on companies to address it in a meaningful way. The report further 
mentions that investors can contribute to a system that encourages a balance between 
cost controls and responsibility towards the workforce with the aim of promoting 
productivity, equality and company reputation.110 This assessment of the importance of 
establishing responsibility towards the workforce is perfectly aligned with our proposals 
that aim, to enhance corporate productivity and the quality of decision-making by 
reinforcing employees’ role in decision-making processes. 
Companies may, of course, instrumentalise this investment sustainability trend by 
seeking to capitalise on its attractiveness and emerging popularity, by choosing one of the 
three options in a purely ‘formalistic compliance’ mind-set, without truly engaging with 
employee representation matters. Even if such concerns are realistic, we argue that 
instrumentalisation-driven actions are better than no actions at the company level and 
that employees will still benefit from being given a communication channel with the 
company board. It is their gradual empowerment and potential to further increase their 
importance within companies that should neutralise these concerns. 
One useful source of insight regarding the attitude of management and the City 
professional community towards the matter is the responses to the recent FRC 
consultation on the amendment of the Code. 111 Unsurprisingly, most companies and 
                                                             
108 An overview of sustainable investing can be found at Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, ‘Global 
Sustainable Investment Review’ (2014)  
www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GSIA_Review_download.pdf. 
109 Due to the detrimental effects of income inequality, such as populism, political extremism, financial and 
social instability, and reduced economic growth. See TIIP, ‘Why and How Investors Can Respond to 
Income Inequality’ (2018) 
https://www.unpri.org/academic-research/why-and-how-investors-can-respond-to-income-inequality-
/3777.article.  
110 Ibid, 9. 
111 All responses can be found online at: https://www.frc.org.uk/consultation-list/2017/consulting-on-a-
revised-uk-corporate-governance-co. 
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professional associations are on the surface supportive of establishing meaningful 
dialogue with employees, but at the same time they are keen to retain maximum 
flexibility in designing relevant systems and processes and are concerned with the 
language of the proposed amendment to the Code, which they consider to be too 
prescriptive.112 Nevertheless, the business community’s broad support for the idea of 
employee engagement as an element of good corporate governance is in itself significant 
and marks a major change in attitudes towards this issue.  
 
Employee participation’s scope: Growing importance of large private companies 
In recent times, employee participation in the UK has attracted a lot of regulatory 
attention given the employee status within listed companies which, besides its protection 
by labour law, is not recognised under a participatory corporate decision-making role, 
given the historical reasons mentioned earlier in this article. In parallel, arguing for 
employee participation and board representation in large private companies has not 
preoccupied either the academic literature or policy makers to any great extent. This is 
because such companies have been regarded as not needing wider participatory employee 
representation or involvement. This is due to traditional arguments related to the 
predominant role of shareholders within companies with concentrated ownership, the 
absence of capital market features and legal constraints, and the lesser importance of 
private companies, for the wider economy and society, compared with listed ones.  
Nevertheless, such arguments have gradually lost momentum in the UK in light 
of serious corporate scandals in the private sector that blatantly revealed the economic 
and social impact of private companies’ activities,113 similarly to that of listed companies. 
It has now become apparent that the risks for employees are the same in both types of 
companies; this fact should serve as the normative justification for further reflection on 
the employees’ role in decision-making processes to minimise detrimental corporate 
practices at their expense. 
                                                             
112  That being said, some influential investors, such as BlackRock, expressed a negative view. They 
cautioned that: ‘However, it is important that we highlight our concerns with employee representation in 
the UK model. The unintended consequence of mandating stakeholder representation on boards is the 
creation of separate classes of directors, thereby creating special interest groups.  This may undermine the 
effectiveness of the board as it may curtail the ability of the board to fulfil its duty in the event that 
different stakeholders’ interests are deemed to be in conflict.’     
113 The most notable example is the collapse of British Home Stores that led, inter alia, to the loss of 11,000 
jobs. See Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills Committees, ‘BHS’ HC (2016-17) 54.  
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In the UK, the first sign of regulatory attention towards large private companies 
came in 2016 in a government policy paper.114 A subsequent policy paper followed,115 
enabling the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to set up a 
Coalition Group under the chairmanship of Mr James Wates.116 The Coalition’s mission 
was to consult on and lead the formation of the first set of corporate governance 
principles applicable to such companies. The Wates Principles were made public in 
December 2018, 117  and adopting these principles will be one way for companies to 
comply with the new legal requirements for corporate governance reporting for 
companies that either employ more than 2,000 employees or have both a turnover 
exceeding £200 million and a balance sheet exceeding £2 billion.118  
In relation to the specific matter of employee participation in large private 
companies, Principle 6 ‘Stakeholder Relationships and Engagement’ acknowledges that 
corporate boards are responsible for overseeing meaningful engagement with 
stakeholders, including employees, and for having regard to their views when making 
decisions.  Principle 6 does not make specific reference to, nor does it dictate, any 
particular employee participation means. Instead, it refers in general terms to the need to 
develop a range of formal and informal dialogue channels between employees and senior 
management. Furthermore, it indicates that private companies are encouraged to have 
regard to the FRC’s Guidance,119 which includes, inter alia, the possibility to opt for one 
                                                             





116 The members of the Group were the FRC, British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board, the Confederation of British Industry, ICSA: the Governance 
Institute, the Institute of Business Ethics, the Institute of Directors, the Institute for Family Business, the 
Investment Association, and the Trade Union Congress. 
117  FRC, ‘The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies’ (2018) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/31dfb844-6d4b-4093-9bfe-19cee2c29cda/Wates-Corporate-
Governance-Principles-for-LPC-Dec-2018.pdf. 
118 Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/860). It should be mentioned that, 
contrary to other voluntary codes in the EU dealing with corporate governance requirements in private 
companies (e.g. Belgium, Italy and Slovenia), the Wates Principles constitute the first code with legal 
backing, testifying to the UK’s political determination to move forward towards a generally-accepted need 
for the normativisation of corporate governance principles applicable to large private companies. For an 
overview of other national corporate governance codes applicable to private companies, see K. Sergakis, 
‘Written Response to the Wates Principles Public Consultation’ (2018) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/fa65a859-8322-4735-a588-858931f50fe4/Konstantino-Sergakis-
response;.aspx.  
119 FRC, ‘Guidance on the Strategic Report’ (2018), 8.21 
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of the three options initially offered by the CG Code. Of course, these three options 
remain purely at the companies’ discretion, as is the case with their eventual decision to 
adhere to the Wates Principles. 
The type of market pressure that may apply to listed companies cannot be 
expected in large private companies that are also encouraged to adopt one of the three 
options, insofar as such companies do not have a dispersed investor base and are not 
required to comply with the specific requirements of capital markets. Nevertheless, there 
are other actors who regularly interact with large private companies (suppliers, third 
parties, NGOs and other stakeholders) and who could certainly exert pressure on such 
companies to take a more active stance on employee representation matters, as a result of 
the increased social awareness around employee representation issues. 
Indeed, the distinction between listed and private companies may have started 
breaking down given the decreasing number of listings and the overall concerns raised 
about the capacity of stock markets to offer liquidity but not to help companies raise 
substantial capital that prompt companies to go private. 120  If such a distinction is 
gradually fading away, we could therefore argue that corporate governance requirements 
between listed and private companies could be merging in the future. Focusing on 
employee participation, it becomes rather irrelevant to employees and other stakeholders 
whether they are affected by the activities of a private or a listed company. Of course, 
some considerations that affect the rationales for employee participation will continue to 
differ to a certain extent.121 Nevertheless, we argue that our proposals (which will be 
developed further in the next section) are suitable to both types of companies since they 
                                                                                                                                                                              
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/fb05dd7b-c76c-424e-9daf-4293c9fa2d6a/Guidance-on-the-
Strategic-Report-31-7-18.pdf. 
120 In the last two decades, the number of non-financial companies choosing IPOs and the average amount 
of equity raised have significantly declined. The amount of capital raised via listings has also declined, 
triggering an ongoing debate on the importance of capital markets for offering access to equity finance and 
their overall impact on innovation, productivity and economic growth: for an extensive analysis, see 
OECD, ‘OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2016: Changing Business Models of Stock Exchanges and 
Stock Market Fragmentation’ (2016) 132 https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/BFO-2016-Ch4-Stock-
Exchanges.pdf; B. Cournède, O. Denk and P. Hoeller, ‘Finance and Inclusive Growth’ (2015) OECD 
Economic Policy Papers, No. 14 http://www.oecd.org/eco/monetary/finance-growth-inequality.htm. On 
an early study examining the relationship between delistings and corporate governance standards, see S. 
Thomsen and V.F. Bonito, ‘Delistings in Europe and the Costs of Governance’ 
(2007) https://ssrn.com/abstract=986603.  
121 For example, dispersed versus concentrated ownership and the ensuing principle–agent problems and 
the need to balance different interests expressed by shareholders and stakeholders that may have a 
different weight and impact on companies and depending on their status. 
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aim to enable efficient employee participation at various levels within decision-making 
processes with sufficient flexibility. 
It is worth noting that the UK is not the only ‘shareholder primacy’ oriented 
capitalist system that emphasises the need to hold large private companies to higher 
corporate governance standards, inter alia, via the employee participation route. 
Employee participation is gaining momentum in the US as one of the most cost-efficient 
means to reduce income inequality, and it is very interesting to note that the criterion for 
inclusion in the Act is not the company’s status as listed or private, but its annual 
revenue.122 Moreover, in Germany, codetermination rules are triggered by the size of the 
workforce irrespective of whether the company is listed or not. 123  Regulatory and 
political attention, therefore, seems to have shifted towards large companies’ impact on 
stakeholders and society at large, and employee representation has become one means to 
ensure a sounder corporate governance system.  
 
A PATHWAY FOR UK COMPANIES TO FOSTER EMPLOYEE 
PARTICIPATION AND BOARD REPRESENTATION 
This section seeks to review ways in which large UK companies can efficiently 
implement employee participation and board representation. The point of departure is 
that although market failure (shareholder short-termism) prima facie justifies legal 
intervention to encourage employee participation, legal intervention often leads to 
greater costs than those it seeks to remedy. In light of the risk of unintended 
consequences and the lack of conclusive empirical evidence that employee participation 
is economically beneficial in general, we do not advocate for any legal or regulatory 
reforms at this stage. Our proposals are intended to be considered by UK companies, 
institutional investors, trade unions and professional organisations and seek to facilitate 
the voluntary adoption of employee participation schemes. The experience that will be 
gathered from such schemes, their level of adoption by companies, and the outcome of 
future empirical studies in the area should inform law making in the longer term.  
 
                                                             
122 See Warren (n 3 above).  
123  Full parity codetermination applies to companies with 2,000 employees or more, while one-third 
representation to companies having 500 – 1999 employees. See W. Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies (London: SAGE, 1992) 138. 
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The specificities of the UK corporate governance model 
Comparative studies of national corporate governance systems have long established the 
complementarity between various institutions. For instance, employee codetermination, 
strong collective labour voice, reliance on bank finance, concentrated share ownership, 
small capital markets and redistributive pension systems in Germany support each other 
and constitute a workable system.124 Transposing one element only to the UK system 
would be likely to fail or, in the best case, to not bring any positive consequences. In 
particular, the hostility of UK investors towards employee board representation 
combined with the adversarial culture of organised labour,125 and the reliance of UK 
companies on capital market financing would lead to adverse unintended consequences if 
a system similar to the German one were imposed on large UK companies by law. Such 
consequences would probably include a reduction in investment in UK companies and 
companies moving their headquarters to and listing in other jurisdictions to evade the 
scope of application of the legal rules in question. Moreover, the German system is 
conducive to incremental innovation, which is valuable to firms producing complex 
manufactured products, whereas the UK system encourages radical innovation, albeit 
imperfectly due to short-term capital market pressures, as discussed above, which is 
essential for firms in the high technology and finance sectors. As the UK economy 
comprises mostly firms that engage in radical innovation, introducing German-style 
codetermination would disrupt their ability to innovate while at the same time it would 
take a long time, if ever, for manufacturing firms to develop sufficiently to fill the gap 
that would be left by the loss of innovative firms.126  
This is not to say, however, that a corporate governance system must conform 
fully to the archetypes of either the Anglo-Saxon or German models. No doubt, several 
                                                             
124 On the workable complementarity between the main elements of the German system, at least until 
globalisation pressures began in the 1990s, see Dignam and Galanis (n 62 above) 300 – 302. 
125 On this notion, see M.T. Moore, ‘Reconstituting Labour Market Freedom: Corporate Governance and 
Collective Worker Counterbalance’ (2014) 43(4) Industrial Law Journal 398. That being said, the current 
position of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) is in favour of mandatory employee representation on 
corporate boards in the form of electing one third of directors. See J. Williamson, ‘All Aboard: Making 
Worker Representation on Company Boards a Reality’ (TUC Economic Report Series 2016) 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/All_Aboard_2016.pdf . 
126 For a review of the relevant literature, see H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Labour Management: An International Comparison’ in H. Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), Corporate 
Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 15 – 16.  
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mixed approaches have been historically successful. 127  It follows that the traditional 
dichotomy between the two models is no more than a simplification, as the actual picture 
of national systems is much more complicated and varied.128 There is, therefore, scope 
for a country that predominantly follows one system to adopt elements from the other 
system insofar as these elements are adapted to its broader institutional framework.129 On 
this basis, it is argued that employee participation in the UK ought to take a distinct route 
reflecting its institutional framework, and that companies should implemented 
participation gradually.  
 
Employee advisory panels 
In the first place, it is necessary to shift corporate culture vis-à-vis labour participation 
and to foster constructive dialogue between corporate management and employees, and 
a more long-term stance by institutional investors which would view the workforce as a 
valuable corporate governance partner rather than as an adversary. 130  An existing 
institution that is meant to facilitate dialogue is the new employee advisory panels that 
the Corporate Governance Code and the Wates Principles recommend as one of the 
options for listed and large private companies, respectively, to engage with their 
workforce. Indeed, such panels have the potential to improve corporate decision-making 
through the inclusion of the employee perspective, and to enable employees and their 
representatives to develop the necessary skills to act as effective governance players.  
                                                             
127 An example of that is the Dutch system combining a focus on shareholder value and active capital 
market with strong protection of labour. On this, see E. Poutsma and G. Braam, ‘Corporate Governance 
and Labour Management in the Netherlands: Getting the Best of Both Worlds?’ in H. Gospel and A. 
Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison (Oxford: OUP, 
2005). 
128 For a critique of the traditional varieties of capitalism thesis and a more nuanced taxonomy of national 
corporate governance models in OECD countries, see G. Jackson, ‘Towards a Comparative Perspective on 
Corporate Governance and Labour Management: Enterprise Coalitions and National Trajectories’ in H. 
Gospel and A. Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
129 Germany, for instance, has adopted several features of the Anglo-American model since the 1990s 
which have shifted focus towards shareholder value. See Dignam and Galanis (n 62 above) ch 8. 
Nevertheless, codetermination still enjoys broad public support and collective bargaining has adapted to 
demands to link pay with performance. 
130 This would partially replicate the main institutional feature of systems with concentrated ownership and 
enable a meaningful dialogue between institutional investors, employee representatives and management.  
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Introducing such panels will also provide a useful disclosure framework for 
company directors to explain how they engage with employees.131 Indeed, according to 
the new regulatory requirements, the directors’ report must contain a statement in 
relation to the actions taken to introduce, maintain or develop arrangements for, inter alia, 
the systematic provision of information to employees, their regular consultation, and the 
achievement of a common awareness of all employees of the financial and economic 
factors that affect the company’s performance. Additionally, the record must summarise 
how the directors have engaged with employees and how they have had regard to their 
interests and the effect of that regard, including on the main decisions taken by the 
company. We therefore argue that advisory panels can offer a breadth of information to 
directors so as to satisfy all the above-mentioned disclosure requirements and they fit 
perfectly with all these criteria and elements that portray engagement, holistic 
consideration of employee interests and increase of employee awareness. It is the unique 
feature of these panels, namely their capacity to combine engagement with education, 
that makes them stand out from the other two options offered to companies and that 
makes our proposal more convincing in this context. 
An additional advantage of such panels derives from the fact that they allow for 
an indirect replication of the benefits of the dual board system, which is absent in the 
UK framework.132 We argue that the proliferation of employee presence within decision-
making processes is hampered by the presence of a unitary board structure. Indeed, the 
dual board system englobes the presence of employees more naturally since the 
supervisory board offers a distinctive opportunity for holistic and inclusive oversight of 
the company’s management. In the unitary board structure, such features are absent and 
the forced inclusion of employees by interventionist norms may prove to be 
counterproductive. We therefore argue that advisory panels can replicate in some 
respects, in a modest but non-negligible fashion, the advantages of supervisory boards by 
engaging with the board of directors and by raising its awareness of issues related to the 
workforce and to stakeholders. The educational benefits will thus be shared amongst the 
board of directors and the advisory panel in the long run, preparing for the crystallisation 
of such benefits via the second phase of our proposals that relates to the appointment of 
employee representatives to the board. 
                                                             
131 Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/860), Section 14. 
132 In view of the strong cultural bias against two-tier boards, we do not recommend the introduction of 
such structures in the UK by force of law. 
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However, notwithstanding these advantages, it may prove difficult for companies 
to make use of advisory panels, at least at the current stage, due to the general prevailing 
attitude towards employee participation.133 There is no doubt that for a cultural shift to 
occur and for companies to accept the long-term benefits of advisory panels, appropriate 
incentives will need to be given so as not to convey the impression that these panels are 
actually a complex and strongly-binding engagement exercise.  For such a transition to 
gain momentum, we therefore argue for maximum flexibility as regards the composition 
of such panels, the topics dealt with within such groups and the expectations for their 
interaction with the board.134 Allowing such panels to evolve into dialogue venues within 
companies will gradually enable employees to gain familiarity with a series of topics and 
to become a vital part of the decision-making process within companies on a wider and 
more holistic scale. We argue that the advisory panels should be conceived and 
introduced as ‘preparatory labs’ for the creation of a new generation of employees that 
will be called upon to assume decision-making roles within companies in the future.  
Aiming to reinforce this employee preparation phase, some companies may also 
want to combine such panels with the appointment of a non-executive director in direct 
contact with the advisory panel employee members. This additional communication 
channel may prove particularly useful to accelerate employees’ familiarisation with 
decision-making challenges since the non-executive director will have the task of not 
only receiving feedback from the panel, but also providing assistance to prepare its 
members to take on more responsibility as board members in the future.135 
Predicting the efficiency of such panels across the board within the UK business 
sector would be a particularly arduous task since their success will largely depend on the 
                                                             
133 This opinion emerged at the seminar ‘A Code of Corporate Governance for Large Private Companies’ 
held at UCL on 7 November 2018 which brought together representatives from the FRC, TUC and 
academic researchers. To date, most companies who have started choosing one of the three options, 
preference is given to employee director (Capita plc, First Group plc, Mears Group plc and TUI plc) or 
non-executive director (Diageo plc, Hays plc, Legal & General plc, McKay Securities plc, Ted Baker plc 
and Sthree plc) appointments.  
134 Based on discussions we have held with various company secretaries, some companies may be willing to 
move towards the introduction of advisory panels under the condition that flexibility in respect of their 
formation, composition and role is kept. Consequently, it is not the advisory panel itself that may drive 
reluctance to adopt it at the company level, but the various criteria for its formation and ongoing role, as 
well as the expectations for its outcomes when it becomes operational. Therefore, maintaining flexibility is 
crucial to convincing companies to adopt such panels. 
135  On the combination of non-executive directors and advisory panels, see K. Sergakis, ‘Proposed 
Revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code: Written Response (2018) 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/c9b472f6-cabf-4e2f-a411-beaceaff6c79/Sergakis,-Dr-
response;.aspx.  
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institutional safeguards, resources and support within each company. We therefore argue 
that, alongside flexibility, advisory panels would need to be given a clear and continuous 
operational mandate based on each company’s profile, size and activities. We contend 
that it is this continuous mandate, alongside the flexibility provided in our proposed 
model, that can give a new impetus to corporate law so as to enable the workforce to 
contribute to governance. This mission is, in our view, not fully served by existing 
solutions provided under labour law, such as the EU law-derived Information and 
Consultation rights for employees.136 Indeed, under these regulations, a dialogue between 
employees and companies may take place on an ad hoc – and not continuous – basis and 
is subject to a series of conditions.137 It is worth noting, however, that these rights have 
rarely been invoked in the UK.138 Our proposal aims to prolong the temporal dimension 
of employee engagement by creating a continuum within the dialectic between advisory 
panels and boards of directors.  
Be that as it may, we find no antithesis between our proposal and labour law 
regulations since they serve different purposes and can operate in parallel dimensions for 
the holistic treatment of employee matters; advisory panels empower gradually 
employees towards high level hybrid governance and labour law participative forums aim 
to inform employees about matters of crucial importance with the aim to protect them.139  
This corporate law based proposal will thus contribute to empowering employees 
towards higher participation standards within a primarily shareholder based governance 
model, while complementing the parallel labour law normative framework. It is this 
novel governance based approach, in line with the incomplete nature of employee 
contracts that renders corporate law a more suitable instrument to achieve incremental 
change in this area in the long-term.    
                                                             
136 Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 (SI 3426/2004), transposing Directive 
2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJL80/29. For a 
discussion, see R. Gumbrell-McCormick and R. Hyman, ‘Work Councils: The European Model for 
Industrial Democracy?’ in A. Wilkinson, P.J. Gollan, M. Marchington and D. Lewin (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Participation in Organisations (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
137 Such as the conditions for employee requests to negotiate an agreement in respect of information and 
consultation: single request of 10% of the employees as a minimum qualifying threshold or separate 
requests that cumulatively reach within 6 months the same representative threshold: Regulation 7, ibid. 
138 See K.D. Ewing and G.M. Truter, ‘The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations: 
Voluntarism’s Bitter Legacy’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 626. 
139 For example, according to the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, the employer 
must provide information on the businesses’ activities and economic situation, the situation structure and 
probable development of the business and any anticipatory measures in the presence of a threat to 
employment and the decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual 
relations: Regulation 20, ibid. 
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Departing from a formalistic interpretation of the role of advisory panels, in this 
article we aim to interpret their distinctive contribution within companies by focusing 
not on their mere existence but on their concrete operational framework. In order for 
their educational and preparatory role to be fulfilled, attention needs to be paid to their 
specific mandate within each company and to the annual dissemination of outcomes and 
good practices emerging from their operation. Notwithstanding the inevitably divergent 
disclosure of information in this particular context, interested parties will need to focus 
on the transformation of the corporate mind-set and on the familiarity that the members 
of the panel will report to have gained throughout this process.  
Once employee panels have been adopted by many UK companies and provided 
that the experience of the corporate sector of their operation is positive, a future edition 
of the Corporate Governance Code could recommend listed companies to set up such 
panels. Doing so would proliferate their adoption and economic benefits, while at the 
same time preserving flexibility and recognising that, for some companies, employee 
advisory panels will not represent the most efficient structure. 
 
Employee board representation 
Companies that have successfully implemented the first phase of reform can proceed to 
the second phase. As employee share ownership schemes are an existing element of the 
UK framework, and in view of the benefits of combining governance rights with residual 
risk, it is submitted that an effective model would be based on granting the right to 
appoint a number of directors to employees once the employees of a company 
collectively cross certain thresholds of share ownership. The purpose of the special 
appointment rights would be to provide for employee board representation in tandem 
with the extent in which they share the company’s residual risk.  
This would allow a different culture to develop and would enable employees to 
build capacity as governance actors and expand their financial stakes in the companies 
they work for. It is also envisaged that trade unions would include demands for 
employees to be given the opportunity to be paid part of their remuneration in shares on 
favourable terms within their future collective bargaining strategies. Employee share 
ownership could be further facilitated by the government by expanding the relevant tax 
advantages. For instance, the monetary limits that apply for share grants to be exempt 
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from relevant taxes could be increased. The public interest justifying the extension of the 
advantageous treatment of employee share ownership schemes by tax law would be the 
long-term economic benefits to corporate stakeholders and society as a whole arising 
from improved corporate efficiency and the particular benefits accruing to employees. 
The new appointment rights would be incorporated into the articles of 
association of listed companies and large private companies voluntarily.140 Once such 
rights are established, the shares held by employee-shareholders would legally qualify as a 
distinct class of shares, and the right to appoint certain directors would qualify as a class 
right.141 This means that, absent any contrary provision in the articles, the relevant part of 
the articles could only be altered with the consent of 75% of the relevant class of shares 
i.e. shares held by employee shareholders.142 This would allow for some flexibility but at 
the same time would give employee shareholders a veto over any attempt to remove their 
board appointment rights. The new rights would be in addition to employee 
shareholders’ normal voting rights.  
Whether shares owned by employees under such schemes will be transferable or 
not will be up to companies to decide. From the perspective of our proposal, it is 
necessary to clarify that the special appointment rights would apply only in so far as 
shares are owned by employees, so they would not be attached to the shares as such and, 
in the case the shares were transferred to a non-employee, they would not pass onto the 
transferee. As far as listed companies are concerned, the special appointment rights 
proposed herein would deviate from current UK institutional investor expectations of 
‘one share one vote’ and therefore their adoption would require a change of approach by 
investors.143  
The percentage of directors to be appointed by the employee shareholders would 
reflect the size of their combined equity stake, but in a regressive manner and up to a 
maximum of a third of the board, as the more shares employees collectively have, the 
                                                             
140 According to Companies Act 2006, section 21, an alteration to the articles of association requires a 
special resolution, that is, 75% of the total votes.  
141 It has been established by case law that, when a special right is given to a person in their capacity as 
member of a company and only insofar as that person remains a member or retains a number or 
proportion of shares, the shares held by that person constitute a separate class from other shares. See 
Cumbrian Newspapers Group v Cumberland [1986] BCLC 286 and Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099. 
142  This is the standard procedure to vary or abrogate class rights, prescribed by section 631 of the 
Companies Act 2006.  
143  For instance, the Investment Association, a trade body that represents UK investment managers 
managing over £5.7 trillion, ‘strongly supports the principle of ‘One Share – One Vote’’. See Investment 
Association, ‘Investors call for Snap not to be included in market indices’ (27 March 2017) 
https://www.theia.org/media/press-releases/investors-call-snap-not-be-included-market-indices. 
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bigger the practical effect of their normal voting rights. The minimum share ownership 
threshold for employees to be entitled to appoint one member of the board would be 
rather low, but still one requiring a more than trivial stake in the company’s share capital. 
The election of the employee-appointed directors would follow the principle of one vote 
per share, so employee shareholders would vote in accordance with their financial 
participation in the company.  
Each company’s workforce advisory panel would be given the power to 
nominate directors for employee shareholders to consider. TUC argues that nomination 
should mainly come from recognised trade unions plus representative bodies established 
through statutory consultation.144 Nomination by a specified number of workers seems 
to be another option but not the prevalent one.145 We argue that advisory panels are a 
more economically efficient solution in this regard since direct election of employees 
combined with the educational benefits of such panels will allow for a more pragmatic 
multiplication of stakeholder voices within companies.  
The first step would be to enable the formation of advisory panels comprised of 
employees, as explained in the previous part. The second step would be for employees to 
nominate candidates from these panels to become directors. Such directors ought to be 
required by companies’ articles of association to be independent directors,146 and would 
have the same duties as other directors. This would minimise the risk that directors 
appointed by employee shareholders would not act in the interests of the company as a 
whole. Such risk would in any case be mitigated by the fact that employees would own 
shares in the company, but not entirely extinguished, as employees owning a relatively 
small amount of share capital would rationally prioritise their interests as employees over 
and above their interests as shareholders when the two conflict. The third and long-term 
step could include the direct appointment by employees of one employee-director 
amongst the directors to be appointed by the employees, the others remaining 
independent directors. This gradual approach has the benefit of allowing for a 
revitalisation of shareholder activism with nomination to the board of directors of 
persons aiming to represent the different groups in a similar fashion, such as institutional 
shareholders, employee shareholders and others. Employee-nominated directors thus 
                                                             
144 See Williamson (n 125 above) 7. 
145 Ibid. 
146 As defined in the UK Corporate Governance Code, Provision B.1.1.  
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become key players within corporate decision-making mechanisms after having been 
prepared for this role through their participation in advisory panels. 
Of course, a caveat is necessary at this point. Employee share ownership brings 
the inevitable disadvantage that employees become vulnerable to corporate insolvencies 
as in such a case they stand to lose part of their personal wealth as well as their jobs.147 
To mitigate this risk, it is necessary for companies to provide sufficient information to 
employees before they join share ownership schemes regarding the level of risk they are 
taking. This is an area where uniform mandatory rules may be required to ensure that 
employee-investors are fully protected. In addition, companies could explore the 
possibility of making available to employees a form of insolvency insurance that would 
be offered by an insurance firm and paid for by the employees with a possible company 
subsidy. The aim of the insurance would be to compensate employees for at least part of 
the price that they originally paid for their shares in case of insolvency of the company. 
 
PRAGMATISM AND TOKENISM IN EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Our proposal on permanent employee advisory panels and gradual transition towards 
employee representation on boards overcomes the conceptual friction between 
shareholder and hybrid governance since it enables employees to gradually form part of 
the shareholder governance model, without disrupting the established UK approach on 
this matter. The novelty of our normative proposal contributes to the formation of a 
potentially much more efficient mechanism which aims to reap the benefits of both 
governance models while contributing to innovation; in line with our proposed share 
ownership schemes and associated voting rights, employees will align – to a certain 
extent – their economic interests to the ones pursued by shareholders.   
 A critical view of the above-mentioned proposals could be that employees’ role 
may be weakened since it will primarily be their shareholder status that will enable them 
to elect board directors. In other words, our proposals may be seen as shifting the 
attention to shareholder powers while neglecting the future role that employees can play 
as a workforce without any additional ‘shareholder type’ features. We acknowledge the 
                                                             
147 Shareholders are the last to be paid on winding up, and thus practically they never receive anything 
through the liquidation process. This is why they are characterised as residual risk-bearers. See E.F. Fama 
and M.C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’ (1983) 26 The Journal of Law and Economics 327. 
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fact that the employee empowerment will be even more economically and 
organisationally efficient if aligned with the institutional features of the UK ‘shareholder 
oriented’ capitalist model. By awarding an additional economic feature to employees, 
there is no risk of assimilation to shareholders on the grounds that their residual risk in 
the company enables them to appoint directors via an ‘entry fee’ process. The mixture of 
shareholder and stakeholder features is not uncommon in today’s markets. Several high-
profile NGOs have become shareholders to exert pressure on companies at various 
levels.148 In parallel, particular in the US, it is common for public sector pension funds, 
universities and religious organisations to use their voting power to promote 
environmental and social agendas.149 Attributing the same dual function to employees 
can only reinforce their presence within companies without diverging from their 
stakeholder status.  
The question of enforcement of the engagement agenda with the workforce is 
also a challenging issue whose implications will undoubtedly arise in the public debate. 
More recently, bold proposals have come to light arguing that employee (without share 
ownership) derivative claims would be preferable to ensure compliance with their 
interests, following Section 172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006, and the three options 
given to companies to demonstrate relationships with the workforce. 150   While we 
acknowledge the ‘tokenism’ concerns related to adopting flexible and malleable 
regulatory approaches in this context, we also accept the perfectible character of 
derivative actions in terms of enforceability and their overall operational context.151  
Aiming to ensure the success of the workforce engagement compliance agenda 
upon litigation mechanisms may shift attention away from the real challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead. Indeed, employee derivative claims would compromise the 
current plans for meaningful engagement with the workforce and drive employees 
                                                             
148  For an early study on this topic, see T. Guay, J.P. Doh and G. Sinclair, ‘Non-Governmental 
Organisations, Shareholder Activism, and Socially Responsible Investments: Ethical, Strategic, and 
Governance Implications’ (2004) 52(1) Journal of Business Ethics 125. 
149 On this, see G. L. Clark, J. Salo and T. Hebb, ‘Social and Environmental Shareholder Activism in the 
Public Spotlight: US Corporate Annual Meetings, Campaign Strategies, and Environmental Performance, 
2001-04’ (2008) 40 Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 1370; C. Flammer, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Shareholder Reaction: The Environmental Awareness of Investors’ (2013) 56 Academy of 
Management Journal 758; and L. Schopohl, ‘The Materiality of Environmental and Social Shareholder 
Activism – Who cares?!’ (2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991544. 
150 N. Safari and M. Gelter, ‘British Home Stores Collapse: The Case for an Employee Derivative Claim’ 
(2018) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1, 11. 
151 A.R. Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: a Normative Inquiry’ (2014) 43 Common Law 
World Review 89. 
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towards litigation for a drastic – yet short-term – solution, instead of allowing them to 
potentially reap the benefits of a longer-term engagement process with the board. 
Employees would therefore expect courts to secure compliance with matters that regard 
them and would not make the necessary effort to advance their own agenda within the 
company. This would also legitimise company boards’ decision not to pursue meaningful 
engagement with the workforce since their attention would be shifted to avoiding 
potential liability instead of communicating with the workforce.  
Engagement norms and duties thus sit uncomfortably with legal enforcement 
mechanisms (derivative claims in this context). Market and social enforcement tools 
(reputational sanctions, market reaction) should be preferable despite their perfectible 
nature.152 We therefore argue that awarding employees (who do not own shares) the right 
to bring a derivative claim risks creating instrumentalisation and disruption trends within 
the company. Employee shareholders would, of course, remain free to bring a derivative 
claim for ordinary claims related to directors’ duties, but the right to initiate litigation 
should not be conceived as a pressure tool for securing the directors’ compliance in 
relation to their interests since this instrumentalisation might have counter-productive 
and economically inefficient effects.153 
Driven by an understanding of corporate law as a means to maximise economic 
efficiency, our proposals aim to inculcate a different enforcement mind-set deriving from 
the workforce that unfolds in a market and social enforcement spectrum. This type of 
enforcement comes from within the company via the gradual empowerment of 
employees and from outside the company via the reaction of third parties or potential 
investors who are concerned about risks related to inequality or lack of engagement.154 
Under our proposal, the formation of a continuous ‘dialectic’ between different market 
actors, including but not limited to investors who integrate ESG criteria in their 
investment strategies, and social enforcers who will continue to nudge the adoption of 
sustainable practices, becomes realistically achievable. Such ‘dialectic’ will also have a 
                                                             
152 For an overview of the dichotomy between legal and social enforcement in relation to engagement 
duties, see K. Sergakis, ‘Legal Versus Social Enforcement’ in H. Birkmose and K. Sergakis (ed), Enforcing 
Shareholder Duties (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019) 128. More generally, on the limitations of public 
enforcement by regulatory authorities, see also Andreas Kokkinis, Corporate Law and Financial Instability 
(Abington: Routledge, 2017) 180 – 182. 
153  Employees increasingly interested in initiating litigation against directors, instead of attempting to 
engage and voice their agenda within the company, would force boards to dedicate time and resources to 
face litigation. Attempting to resolve internal company affairs of that nature in court would therefore lead 
to costly and damaging outcomes in the long term. 
154 See TIIP (n 109 above). 
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long-lasting impact on companies since the exerted pressure towards a long-term agenda 
will be multi-faceted and will be stemming from actors who will gradually gain more 
prominence and visibility (employees, investors, NGOs, consumers and others).155   
Aiming to draw a bigger picture of the potential impact of our proposals on the 
UK corporate governance framework, we argue that our flexible approach, based on 
advisory panels and subsequent employee board representation under employee share 
ownership schemes, is also well suited to the current need to avoid stricter and unduly 
burdensome legal reforms that would actually risk reducing employees’ economic utility 
within companies. Indeed, concerns may be raised in relation to an interventionist 
approach that would dictate employee board representation without any preparatory or 
educational processes. Employees would indeed be appointed but would not necessarily 
benefit to the same extent compared to the benefits that they can derive from our 
flexible approach.  
Our proposal could also stand as a viable alternative to the disruption of the flow 
of information that could occur by the mere appointment of employee directors156 who 
would be conflicted between their employee and director status, refraining from sharing 
all the information with the workforce.157 Indeed, such information flow problems could 
be aggravated within the UK context, in light of the unitary board structure that will 
include employee directors without any separation between the supervisory and 
management boards, as is the case in Germany.158 Employee directors would therefore 
find it difficult to ensure a regular flow of information to the workforce.159  
Following our approach, by introducing advisory panels out of which candidates 
to the board would emerge in the long run, this obstacle can be avoided at least in the 
beginning when the most crucial phase of transforming corporate culture would unfold. 
                                                             
155 See, for example, the high profile shaming campaign launched by Amazon employees in relation to 
climate change: ‘Hundreds of Amazon Employees Publicly Attack its Climate Record’ Financial Times, 27 
January 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/33dce38e-4128-11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d. Consumers also 
start showing increased levels of awareness and demonstrate their preference for companies that respond 
to climate and social change: Salesforce Research, ‘Ethical Leadership and Business’ (2020) 
https://c1.sfdcstatic.com/content/dam/web/en_us/www/documents/research/salesforce-research-
ethical-leadership-and-business.pdf. 
156  As has been observed in the German context: M. Roe, ‘German Codetermination and German 
Securities Markets’ (1998) 98 Columbia Business Law Review 167, 171. 
157 For a critical approach, see Safari and Gelter (n 150 above) 16. 
158 Streeck (n 123 above). 
159 On the concept of codetermination as an information channel between employees and directors, see G. 
Hertig, ‘Codetermination as a (Partial) Substitute for Mandatory Disclosure?’ (2006) 7 European Business 
Organisation Law Review 123, 130.  
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In other words, during the initial period of advisory panels, the company’s focus would 
be on enabling employees to engage with the board while gaining familiarity with a series 
of issues and contributing to the gradual escalation towards a more holistic decision-
making model that would be coupled, at a later stage, with the nomination of employees 
to the board. Even if at that second stage employee directors find it difficult to maintain 
the informational flow, the overall participative governance model will have been 
enriched within each company in the meantime. Therefore, although some problems 
may persist, the benefits of appointing employees to the board (long-term accrued value 
generated by their presence) will outweigh the costs (potential conflicts of interest and 
informational flow problems). 
The perils arising from the adoption of a formalistic compliance approach in 
relation to employee participation and representation standards cannot be 
underestimated. For example, the codetermination system in Germany shows some other 
perfectible elements in relation to its overall approach since it dictates employee board 
participation without the intermediate step of preparedness for assuming such roles. 
Without claiming that the lack of this intermediate step is behind the imperfections of 
the codetermination system, which has been shaped in different institutional and 
historical circumstances, we aim to advance a new employee participation and 
representation model going beyond well-known systems and conceiving employees’ role 
in a novel, efficiency-driven spectrum. 
Interventionist approaches 160  may, of course, be more useful to increase 
regulatory visibility and the utility of legal reforms for public consumption purposes, as 
they will be successful in conveying the message that balance amongst shareholders and 
employees, or income inequality, can be achieved via such reforms. The latter trend is 
becoming increasingly popular in both the UK 161 and the US, 162  by focusing on the 
redistribution of wealth maximisation and on the reduction of income inequality for the 
benefit of employees. Notwithstanding the laudable aims of such agendas, we argue that 
                                                             
160 Safari and Gelter (n 150 above). 
161  See, for example, the Brexit-driven discussion on the reform of UK corporate governance at the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (n 114 above). In this policy paper, Theresa May 
referred to the need to ‘build an economy that works for everyone, not just the privileged few’ and 
mentioned that ‘For many ordinary working people – who work hard and have paid into the system all 
their lives - it’s not always clear that business is playing by the same rules as they are.’ The policy paper was 
issued some months after the Brexit referendum that was perceived, inter alia, as an expression of 
frustration by low- and middle-income workers.  
162 See Warren (n 3 above). 
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they are not economically efficient in the long term. Nevertheless, the long-term 
recalibration of corporate governance structures and corporate culture can only be 
realistically achieved by flexible and adaptable solutions that focus on the long-term 
economic efficiency of the reforms and not on short-term political gains deriving from 
drastic legal changes. 
That being said, in the longer-term, if our approach is followed successfully by a 
critical mass of large UK companies, the available evidence may come to justify legal 
intervention to nudge companies towards employee participation. One way to achieve 
this, while preserving an element of flexibility would be via the introduction of strong 
default rules, i.e. rules that require a costly process to be disapplied and hence aim to 
discourage contractual mutation.163  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we demonstrated that there is no a priori reason for employee 
participation in corporate governance to be inefficient and that there are sound grounds 
for UK companies to explore it as a viable option. We formulated a new flexible 
approach, suitable to the specificities of the UK institutional framework, which can offer 
pragmatic and long-term solutions to the challenges of employee participation and board 
representation. Engagement with the workforce should become meaningful and 
realistically achievable in both listed and large private companies, as our analysis has 
aimed to show, given the commonly shared challenges and the impact of all types of 
companies’ strategies upon employees.  
Our approach constructs a new paradigm for employee participation in two 
distinct phases: the introduction of formal advisory panels, and the subsequent 
appointment of employees to boards via employee share ownership schemes. Addressing 
concerns of tokenism, we argue that such structure can offer a series of benefits to 
                                                             
163  The economic function of strong default rules cannot be explained simply by reference to the 
Easterbrook and Fischel thesis that default rules ought to deliver what the parties would have wanted. See 
e.g. F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). An alternative economic theory of default rules has been proposed by Ayres and 
Gertner. According to this theory, it is often efficient to impose default rules that no party would have 
wanted (penalty default rules) to incentivise parties to disclose information to the other party in order to 
contract around the penalty rule, or strong default rules that can act as a substitute for mandatory rules 
when there is a mild case of market failure. See I. Ayres and R. Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87; and I. Ayres, ‘Making a 
Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel’ (1992) 59 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1391. 
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employees, most notably in the area of education, preparedness for appointment to the 
board and ongoing dialogue within the company. Disregarding the need to participate in 
a gradual cultural transformation in a holistic way that involves all company 
constituencies, and opting instead for drastic short-term solutions that would be both 
costly and disruptive, would ultimately fail to prepare companies and their employees to 
adequately face the challenges lying ahead. Conversely, our approach fosters long-term 
value creation by facilitating closer engagement of companies with employees and 
investors and the inculcation of a culture of trust between capital, labour and 
management. This new paradigm aims to accord a new raison d’être to shareholder-based 
governance with wider ramifications for the re-conceptualisation of corporate law as a 
hybrid governance mechanism enabling long-term engagement of investors, employees 
and other stakeholders. 
